This paper studies communication and information sharing in teams, where agents work under conditions of moral hazard in a correlated environment, production is jointly determined, and performance is evaluated jointly. One agent has private access to pre-decision productivity information, which can be shared with the uninformed agent either formally through the accounting system by directly communicating to the principal who then discloses the information, or informally by signaling through his action. The principal always prefers information sharing to no information sharing, even though communication does not result in reduced pay of the informed agent, but rather improves the uninformed agent's productive choices. However, it may be less costly if both agents are uninformed, depending on the states of productivity and the mode information sharing. Further, neither type of information sharing dominates and the optimal mode of information sharing also depends on the states of productivity. With direct information sharing, the principal can tailor the uniformed agent's payments to the actual state, just as if the information was public, but the informed agent earns more rents. The downside to indirect information sharing is that the principal remains uniformed, but the advantage is that the informed agent's payment is lower due to the effect of the uninformed agent's actions. The normally strong team incentives are decreased for the informed agent, which results in lower payments.
. However, these proponents ignore the effect of different types of communication on incentives and performance pay, which all agree is also an important consideration of a team's success. This paper focuses on the incentive effect of communication and sharing of pre-decision, productivity information that affects agents' productive choices.
Prior work on communication in models of moral hazard focuses on single-agent settings, and is hard pressed to find strict benefits of communication (Lambert, 2001; Christensen and Feltham, 2005) . 2 In a single-agent setting, the only value in communication is in reducing payments due to lower risk premiums; however, the incentives needed for communication can be too strong and the value lost. In a team setting, the advantage is that communication from one team member can be valuable not because it reduces the team bonus for that team member, but because it is informative about the team's productive environment and can be used to share information with uninformed team members, improving productive decisions.
I use a principal multi-agent model, with two risk neutral agents with limited liability who work in a correlated environment. The reason to use risk neutral agents is to focus on the incentives related to communication and information sharing, rather than risk effects. Only a group (i.e. aggregate) measure of performance is observed and each agent's individual output is indistinguishable. The team output depends on each agent's productive act and a random, but common, state of productivity, except in the highest state where output is high regardless of the agents' effort, so no effort is the efficient production plan in this state. An example of the type of production considered here is an assembly line production, where workers are assigned a task, the productivity environment is common, and output is attributed to all of the workers. Or it could refer to an even more specific situation where a team works on a single project together, such as with product development or problem-solving teams. Another alternative is to consider a broader also prefers that the informed agent share his information with the uninformed agent prior to taking his action in order to improve the uninformed agent's productive choices. In addition, signaling has another benefit over no information sharing: it reduces the rents of the informed agent because of the effect of the uninformed agent's actions on the informed agent's incentives.
The normal team incentives provide an incentive to work given the other agent is working, but with signaling these incentives are unnecessary. If the informed agent does not work hard, then the uninformed agent will also choose not to work hard. Thus the payment to the informed agent is lower than payments in the normal team setting with no information sharing.
A related question to the benefits of information sharing is whether or not both agents should be restricted from accessing the production information. As mentioned previously, Apple maintains strict secrecy among its employees, while Whole Foods, whose organizational design relies heavily on teams, shares all financial information with its employees (Fishman, 1996) .
Despite the benefits of information sharing with one informed agent, the principal may prefer that both agents are uninformed. This is due to the rents that the informed agent earns. In order to provide incentives to the informed agent to work hard given his private information, the principal must overpay in the more productive states. Making the agents uninformed reduces the rents in the higher productive states, but the agents work hard in all three states. Even with the productive inefficiencies, if the informed agent's information rents are high enough, then the principal will prefer that both agents are uninformed.
The second main result concerns the optimal mode of information sharing. I consider whether using the accounting system to disseminate information or whether informal signaling between the agents is more efficient. Of the two modes of information sharing, surprisingly the use of the accounting system in providing full disclosure does not dominate partial, informal signaling of information. There are several tradeoffs between the two types of information sharing. First, with direct information sharing, the informed agent earns higher rents than with signaling. With signaling, because of the effect of the uninformed agent's actions on the incentives for the informed agent, the payment is lower. Second, the expected payments for the uninformed agent may be higher or lower with direct information sharing. Regardless of whether the uninformed agent is informed via the principal's public release of information or indirectly by observing the informed agent's action, the agent makes the most efficient productive decisions.
With direct disclosure, the principal is informed and provides state-by-state incentives to work hard, rather than incentives based on the expected productivity. With indirect information sharing, the principal remains uninformed, and so does not direct the uninformed agent, state-bystate, but rather makes a payment based on the average productivity in the two productive states.
The uninformed agent's expected payments may less with signaling than with direct disclosure;
in the high state and in the intermediate state, the expected pay is more with signaling but in the low state it is less than with signaling. Overall, signaling is preferred as long as there is either no cost or a low cost with the uninformed agent. This paper is related to several streams of research. First, and foremost is the literature on communication of private, pre-decision information with a single, risk-averse agent, which started with Christensen (1981) , who considers communication but whose focus is on demonstrating that the principal is not always better off with an informed agent. This work was followed by Baiman and Evans (1983) and Penno (1984) , who study the value of communication when the agent has private, pre-decision information. In this work, communication is valuable because of improved risk sharing. This paper extends this literature by considering a multi-agent team setting, which allows for study of additional modes of communication, but abstracts away from risk-sharing considerations by focusing on risk-neutral parties. Melumad and Reichelstein (1989) also abstract away from risk-sharing and with a single, risk neutral agent with pre-contract information show that communication can be valuable because of either improved action choice or lower informational rents as long as the performance measure is coarse enough compared to the agent's information and action choice. This paper is also related to the team literature that considers communication but focuses on collusive agreements among agents, rather than on conveying productivity information that affects compensation (Laffont and Martimort, 1997; Tirole, 1992) . Also related is the collusion literature, including Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) , Itoh (1992 and 1993) , Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991) , and Varian (1990) . In this work, the benefit of agents' ability to observe other agents' efforts comes agents' ability to commit to side payments and which induce more cooperation and improved risk sharing. In contrast, in this paper, I do not assume that agents can commit to side contracting and the benefit of observing the other agent's effort is due to information credibly conveyed in the agent's action.
Other work that has studied the question of agents' access to private, pre-decision information include Baiman and Sivaramakrishnan (1991) , Bushman et al. (2000) , who restrict communication from a privately informed, risk averse agent and demonstrate the value of agent's information. A recent paper that studies imprecise pre-decision information is Rajan and Sauoma (2006) who demonstrate that in a single agent, multi-task setting where the agent is privately informed and able to communicate, the principal prefers that the agent be either perfectly informed or perfectly uninformed. All of this work is based on a single-agent setting, while this paper expands the setting to include multiple agents working in a correlated environment, and where agents are not symmetrically informed.
Model
The model consists of a risk neutral principal and two risk neutral agents, 1 and 2, who have limited liability. Each agent contributes unobservable, costly effort to a team project. The agent's effort can be high or low, e ∈ {0, 1} , and has a cost ce, where c > 0. Agent i' s individual output,
x i is also binary and can be good (x i = H) or bad (x i = L). The probability distribution of x i depends on agent i's choice of effort as well as a common shock, θ n , n ∈ {L, M, H}, with each state equally likely.
Under the most favorable shock, θ H , the output of both agents will be high, regardless of their effort, while under θ M and θ L , the likelihood that an agent will produce the high output depends only on that agent's effort. With θ M , the probability that agent i produces output x i = H is p 1 if he chooses high effort and p 0 if he chooses low effort, with p 1 > p 0 . With θ L , the probability that agent i produces output x i = H is q 1 if he chooses high effort and q 0 if he chooses low effort, with q 1 > q 0 . Thus, if agent i works hard, the probability that x i = H is 1/3(1 + p 1 + q 1 ) and if agent i shirks, 1/3(1 + p 0 + q 0 ). In the states where effort is productive, assume that p 1 ≥ q 1 and p 0 ≥ q 0 , which means that θ M is a more productive state than θ L . Also, assume that in the intermediate state, marginal productivity is higher than in the low state, or p 1 -p 0 > q 1 -q 0 > 0. 3
The informed agent directly observes the productivity state, and that information can be shared with the uninformed agent in two ways. One method, which I refer to as direct information sharing, involves public disclosure of the information from the principal. In this case, the informed agent reports the information directly to the principal, who then releases the agent's information to the uninformed agent in the form of a verifiable report. The disclosure takes place early, before the agents have chosen their actions. The second method involves no direct communication between the informed agent and the principal, but rather indirect communication between agents. I refer to this as indirect information sharing. In this case, the informed agent signals his information through his choice of effort to the uninformed agent. Because the informed agent communicates his information through his effort to the uninformed agent, he cannot communicate complete information but can only indicate whether or not he observed the high state θ H .
The timeline is as follows. Given the information system, the principal offers each agent a contract, which each agent may reject in which case the game ends, or the agents accept the contract and join the firm. Nature determines the value of θ. The informed agent privately observes the state, which may be reported privately to the principal, and if so, is denoted by ! .
The informed agent then chooses his effort, e Inf . Next, the principal may release the report to the uniformed agent, who then chooses his effort e UnInf . Alternatively, the informed agent does not report his information to the principal, but the uninformed agent observes the informed agent's effort. Finally the performance evaluation system produces a performance measure of the team's production.
The control system produces an aggregate (i.e. team) performance measure of the project, x = x 1 + x 2 which can be high, medium, or low, and which is available for contracting. A high team output (x H ) means that x 1 = x 2 = H, medium output (x M ) means either x 1 = H and x 2 = L or x 1 = L and x 2 = H, and low team output (x L ) is when x 1 = x 2 = L. The principal uses the performance measure produced by the control system and any communication from the informed agent on which to base payments to the agents. With communication, the payment to the informed agent depends on the team's output, x j , as well as the informed agent's communication and is denoted
denote the vector of payments to agent i, given the report ! n , n = L, M, H. Let pr( x j ! n ,e 1 ,e 2 ) denote the probability of team output, j = L, M, H, given the state θ n , n = L, M, H and given both agents' choice of effort. Throughout the paper, I assume that work is sufficiently valued by the principal, so that with information about θ, the principal wishes the agents to work hard only when the states are θ M and θ L .
The principal's problem with one informed agent and communication but no information sharing, Program P I,U as shown below, is to minimize expected payments to the agent, subject to the agent's participation (individual rationality, IR) constraints that ensure the agent will at least earn his reservation wage, which I normalize to zero. The incentive compatibility constraints ensure the agent prefers high effort to low effort and reports the information truthfully. From the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979) , I restrict my analysis to truthful reporting. The first set of incentive compatibility constraints (IC 1 -Inf) is for the state θ H and ensures that the agent reports truthfully and chooses low effort. The second set of incentive compatibility constraints (IC 2 -Inf)
is for states θ M and θ L and ensure that the agent prefers to work hard and report truthfully.
Program P I,U Min
The principal's problem with the uninformed agent depends on whether or not information is shared, and if it is shared, the method of information sharing. The specific programs are specified in subsequent sections.
Analysis

Benchmark -Public Information
In this section, the principal and both agents observe the productivity state so that all parties are informed. With an informed principal, communication from the agents is redundant.
The reason to consider public information as a benchmark is because when an agent is privately informed, inefficiencies arise due to overpayment and having to provide incentives to the agent based on his private information. In the case of uninformed agents, there are additional inefficiencies related to misallocated effort, when agents work hard in the high productive state, even though output is the same, regardless of effort. Understanding the role communication and information sharing entails being able to compare it to when the principal is also informed.
An informed principal's problem is similar to when the agents are privately informed and report their information, except that the truth-telling constraints are not necessary and ! , the report of the signal, is replaced with θ, the actual state. The principal solves, for agents i = 1, 2:
Program P Min
The solution is for both incentive constraints to be binding. The optimal contract is as follows. Under θ H , the principal will pay the agents nothing because in the high productivity state, the agents always achieve the high outcome even without working hard. However, under θ M or θ L the principal wants the agents to work hard. Payments under the optimal contract are w i (θ H ) = (0,
, 0, 0), and expected cost is = 2c 3
With the principal informed about productivity, payments can be based not only on the team's output, but can also be tailored specifically to the productivity state. If the high productivity state occurs, then the payment is zero, because the principal does not want the agents to work hard. If the state is either θ L or θ M , then the principal makes a payment only if the entire team is successful, so the payment can be interpreted as a bonus, but the amount of the bonus depends on the specific state. These payments are tailored to the state, in that the payment depends inversely on the marginal productivity of the state. The state with a higher marginal productivity is easier to control (and thus payment is lower) than one with a lower marginal productivity, because working hard in the more productive state means the team is more likely to be successful compared to the state with lower marginal productivity, where it is harder to produce the high output.
In the following sections, I consider communication and information sharing when only one agent is privately informed. With the principal uninformed, generally the payments can only be based on the output and not the signal of the productivity state. However, with communication, the payments can also be based on the agent's report of the productivity signal. In addition, with only one agent informed with pre-decision information, the principal must design different incentives than if the agent is uninformed.
Private Information
In this section, the productivity state is not publicly observed by the principal and both agents, but rather the informed agent privately observes the state prior to making his effort choice. I first analyze the case where there is no information sharing, with both agents uninformed and then with just one agent privately informed. This helps establish the basis for understanding the effect of communication between the informed agent and the principal, as well as for sharing information with the uninformed agent.
No Information Sharing
In this section, I first analyze the case where both agents are uninformed and then I consider asymmetrically informed agents, where one agent is informed and directly communicates to the principal but the principal does not release the information to the uninformed agent. The reason to start with no information sharing is to establish that communication is not beneficial unless it can be disseminated to the uninformed agent and used in contracting with the uninformed agent.
With both agents uninformed, the principal motivates the agents to always work hard.
The principal's problem with both agents uninformed is as follows:
The solution involves a binding incentive constraint, payments are w =
, 0, 0), and expected cost is
Compared to the setting where the productivity information is public, there are two primary inefficiencies. First, agents work hard in all three states, which leads to an increased payment, ex ante, due to the inefficiency. Because agents are uninformed, the payment is based on the average of the marginal productivity of all three states, which must be high enough to cover the expected cost of working hard and must motivate each agent to work hard given the other agent is working hard. Second, the payments cannot be tailored to the state, which results in overpayment not only in the high state (θ H ), where agents will definitely produce the high output and where the efficient payment is zero, but also in the intermediate state (θ M ), and possibly in the low state (θ L ), depending on how the states vary. Improving the agents' productive decisions by providing information about the productivity state will reduce the cost of working hard, but there are incentive costs from privately informed agents that may outweigh this benefit, and which I consider next.
Next I consider the case with one agent who is informed and who communicates to the principal, but there is no information sharing. With no information sharing, the principal does not share the informed agent's report with the uninformed agent, nor does the informed agent indirectly communicate with the other agent. Agents choose their effort simultaneously.
Incentives for the agents differ not only because of the difference in information at the time of choosing productive effort, but also because the informed agent makes more efficient productive choices and incurs a lower cost of working hard than the uninformed agent. The uninformed agent's expected payment depends only on the team's output, and is denoted w j UnInf , j = L, M, H.
The principal's problem with one informed agent and only direct communication between the informed agent and the principal is to solve Program P I, U for the informed agent, but the principal's problem with the uniformed agent and no information sharing is as follows:
Program P U, I Min
There is one difference regarding the uninformed agent between the program with one uninformed agent, P U,I , and the program above with both agents uninformed, P U,U . The uninformed agent will work hard in all three states, as when both agents are uninformed, but here the informed agent will not work hard in the high productivity state. However, this does not affect expected output in the high state. For the uninformed agent, the solution involves a binding incentive constraint, with payments, w UnInf = ( 3c p 1 ( p 1 ! p 0 ) + q 1 (q 1 ! q 0 )
, 0, 0). The payment reflects the agent's lack of information about the productivity state and is a weighted average of the marginal productivity of all the states, the same as when both agents are uninformed. For the informed agent, determining payments is more complex.
Starting with the incentive constraints when the agent observes the low state, θ L , one binding constraint is IC 2 , which provides incentives to work hard and tell the truth. First, the constraint with truthtelling and working hard is binding, or
, 0, 0). The uninformed principal must at least pay the agent based on the low productivity signal (which translates to the higher payment of the two productive states), in order to motivate the agent to work hard. In order to provide incentives to communicate truthfully, the other incentive constraints (IC 2 ) must also hold,
The worst case would be the same as no communication,
where the payments are the same regardless of the report, or w Inf ( 
, 0, 0). In that case, all of the constraints would also be binding, or
H. However, it may be possible that there is a solution in terms of w Inf (! H ) or w Inf (! M ) that differs from the no communication case.
Turning to the incentive constraints when the agent observes the intermediate state, θ M , the incentive constraint that motivates hard work and truthful reporting will not be binding, or
. The reason is that if it is binding, because of the higher marginal productivity, the payment will be so low that the agent will want to report θ L instead of θ M or pr(x j /! M ;1,1)
there are two sets of constraints remaining for the high signal, θ M :
Given the solution for the state θ L and the payments w Inf (! L ), when the agent observes the higher productivity state θ M , because of the higher productivity and the higher payment, the agent will want to work hard and report ! L rather than not work hard and report ! L . Technically, for r = L, this means that the right-hand side of (2) is as least as big as the right-hand side of (1),
, which is true, given the payments w Inf (! L ). If the IC is binding for r = L with high effort, then the payments for the reported state θ M will be the same as when the agent reports θ L , or w Inf ( 
, 0, 0).
Similar logic can be applied to reporting ! H , however, here the problem may be that the agent will not want to work hard and report ! H , but this depends on the payments for the report of ! H , which I turn to next.
Finally, the constraints for the high signal, θ H , ensure that the agent does not work hard, but reports truthfully instead of reporting θ M or θ L . In order to ensure truthful reporting of the signal θ H the principal must pay the agent the higher of the two payments, w H
To summarize, the optimal contract is w Inf 
, 0, 0), and the expected cost is = (1 + p 1 2 + q 1 2 )
Compared to the public information setting, the informed agent earns information rents in the high and the intermediate productive states. Because the informed agent's payment must be high enough to induce work in both productive states and to communicate truthfully, it is based on the marginal productivity of the low productive state. Even though the informed agent's effort choice is efficient, the payment is higher than if the information was public. With the uninformed agent and no information sharing, the inefficiencies are the same as above when both agents are uninformed. The uninformed agent works hard in all three states, and is overpaid in order to induce high effort.
In addition, with no benefit from communication, the inefficiencies from having one agent informed might be more than if both agents are uninformed, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: With one agent informed and no information sharing, communication is never strictly valuable to the principal, and the principal will prefer that both agents are uninformed if q 1 z p 1 y < 1 2 .* * where y = p 1 -p 0, and z = q 1 -q 0 .
Proof: All proofs in the Appendix.
If information is not shared with the uninformed agent, then communication is not strictly valuable to the principal. The lack of value in communication with no information sharing can be reconciled with findings of prior work of communication with single, risk-averse agent settings (Lambert, 2001; Christensen and Feltham, 2005; Penno, 1984) . In that work, communication is only valuable because of a risk reduction in the non-productive states. In the productive states, communication is not valuable because the truth-telling constraints imply that the agent's expected utility must be independent of the communication. With risk-neutral agents, there is no possibility and therefore no benefit to reducing risk in the non-productive state of θ H . With no benefit to communication, the proposition also demonstrates that the principal may prefer that both agents are uninformed.
The reason that the principal may prefer agents are uninformed, has to do with differences in expected payments for both the informed agent and the uninformed teammate.
With the informed agent, the payment is based on the marginal productivity of the low state, and regardless of his information, the informed agent is paid the bonus in all three states, just like the uninformed agent. Yet whether the informed agent's payment is higher or lower depends on the productivity in the low state compared to the intermediate state. If the productivity in the low state is too low, then the informed agent's pay increases more than the uninformed agent's pay because that payment is only tied to the productivity of the low state.
Because agents work in a correlated environment, the information about the state of productivity is informative about the uninformed agent's performance and therefore would be useful in contracting (Holmstrom, 1979; Demski, 2008; Baiman & Demski, 1980; Antle & Demski, 1988) . A natural question then seems to be whether or not the information about productivity should be shared with the uninformed agent and if so how. I consider two possibilities for making the uninformed agent informed. First, the informed agent can report his information to the principal, who then makes the informed agent's report public, sharing it with the uninformed agent before he chooses his action. Another option is that instead of communication to the principal, the informed agent can signal or indirectly communicate some of his information to the uninformed agent. The purpose is to understand whether it is always beneficial to share information with the uninformed agent, and which type of communication, indirect or direct the principal prefers. The next section takes up these questions.
Direct Information Sharing
In this section, I consider information sharing with the uninformed agent in which the principal publicly releases the informed agent's report before the agent takes his action. I also consider whether the principal prefers that both agents are uninformed rather than having one agent informed and whose information is shared via the pubic report. In a subsequent section, I consider indirect communication between the informed agent and the uninformed agent via the informed agent's action, and then compare the two methods of making the uninformed agent informed.
After receiving the informed agent's information, the principal releases this information by making the informed agent's information public and releasing a hard (i.e. verifiable) report prior to the agent's choice of action. Then the previously uninformed agent is better informed about his productive choices. However, making the uniformed agent informed changes that agent's incentives, which affects the payment. The principal must provide incentives for the agent to work hard given the information about the productive states. Therefore it is not clear whether or not the principal should make the informed agent's information public.
The principal's problem for both agents with direct information sharing is as follows:
-ce, n = L, M, r = L, M, H, e = 0,1 (IC 2 -Inf)
For the informed agent, the solution is as above, when the informed agent directly communicated to the principal but the principal did not release the information to the uninformed
, 0, 0). For the uninformed agent, the two incentive constraints are binding and the solution is
, 0, 0), and expected cost is 1/
With the information communicated by the informed agent to the principal, the principal's problem with the uninformed agent is the same as when the principal observes the productivity state directly. Thus, the payment to the uninformed agent is the same as the benchmark when the information is public, and there are no inefficiencies with the uninformed agent. However, just as above with no information sharing, the informed agent is overpaid and earns information rents in the high and intermediate state.
Comparing the expected payment when information is made public to the expected payment when the information is not made public and to when both agents are uninformed yields the following result.
Proposition 2: If one agent is informed and directly communicates to the principal, the principal will always prefer that the information be disclosed to the uninformed agent rather than not disclosed, but the principal will prefer that the agents are both uninformed if q 1 z p 1 y < (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) y + q 1 ( p 1 z + q 1 y) 5(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) y ! q 1 ( p 1 z + q 1 y) .* * where y = p 1 -p 0, and z = q 1 -q 0 .
With information sharing, communication is valuable because the principal can direct the uninformed agent's actions and tailor his pay on the marginal productivity of the state, as reported by the informed agent. However, even with the benefit from communication, there are conditions under which the principal prefers that both agents are uninformed rather than allowing one agent to become informed and communicate and disclose that information. As in the previous section, the informed agent earns rents in the high and intermediate state and the principal will prefer that the informed agent is uninformed as long as the productivity in the low state is low enough compared to the productivity in the intermediate state. This is also true in this setting; however, the condition in Proposition 2 is stronger than the condition in Proposition 1 because of the savings from making the uninformed agent informed.
Comparing expected payments state by state for the uniformed agent when the other agent is also uninformed to when the other agent is informed and that information is communicated and disclosed, demonstrates the tradeoffs of providing more information. In the high state θ H , the uninformed agent works hard and is paid while with direct disclosures the agent does not work hard and is not paid, thus making the uninformed agent more costly. In the intermediate state, θ M , the uninformed agent is also paid more than with direct disclosures, because the payment is based on the average marginal productivity, rather than based on the marginal productivity of the state. In the low state, θ L , the uninformed agent may or may not be paid more than with direct disclosures, depending on if q 1 z/p 1 y >1/2. Overall, the benefit of making the agent informed outweighs the cost.
In the next section I consider another method for sharing information with the uninformed agent, where the informed agent signals his information to the uninformed agent, rather than reporting it to the principal.
Indirect Information Sharing
Next suppose that the information sharing occurs between the informed agent and the uninformed agent, rather than using the principal as a conduit. I consider indirect communication rather than direct communication between the agents. While side-contracting and collusive agreements are precluded, direct communication between the agents is not barred, but such information is not credible, because the uninformed agent will ignore it. So, the informed agent signals his information to the uninformed agent, rather than communicating to the principal who then publicly releases the informed agent's report. First, only the informed agent observes θ and then chooses his level of effort, which the uninformed agent observes before choosing his own effort.
I first start with the uninformed agent's incentives, using backwards induction to solve the principal's problem. Because the principal wants the agent to work hard in the states θ M and θ L , but not θ H , I assume first that the contract to the informed agent provides these incentives.
Given the contract and after observing the informed agent's choice of action, the uninformed agent updates his beliefs about the signal that the informed agent received. If the uninformed agent observes the informed agent choosing low effort, the uninformed agent believes that the informed agent observed θ H , where low effort is the preferred choice because the team will be successful regardless of effort. If the uninformed agent observes the informed agent working hard, then he believes that the informed agent observed either θ M or θ L , with each state equally likely.
The principal then must provide incentives so that the uninformed agent's strategy is to work hard only if he observes the informed agent working hard; otherwise he should want to choose low effort. The principal designs the uninformed agent's incentive constraint to reflect the uninformed agent's updated beliefs after observing the informed agent's action. The uninformed agent's expected payment is: .5{(1+ p 1 2 + q 1
Next, considering the informed agent's incentives, given the uninformed agent's strategy, the informed agent should want to work hard after observing either θ M or θ L , but not after observing θ H . If the informed agent works hard the uninformed agent also works hard, but if the informed agent chooses low effort, then the uninformed agent will follow suit. This is a change from the normal team incentives, which ensure an agent will work hard given the other agent is also working. The principal designs the informed agent's incentive constraints to ensure that the informed agent prefers to work hard only when he sees θ M or θ L . The principal's problem with indirect communication is as follows:
pr(x j / ! n ;1,1)w j The uninformed agent's payment is found by the incentive constraint similar to when the informed agent did not signal his information. With a binding incentive constraint for the uninformed agent, the payments are w UnInf = ( 2c p 1 ( p 1 ! p 0 ) + q 1 (q 1 ! q 0 )
, 0, 0). The informed agent's payment is determined by the incentive constraints. Starting with the incentive constraint when the informed agent observes the low productivity state, θ L , this incentive constraint must be binding, which implies that w H Inf = c (q 1 2 ! q 0 2 ) , and w M Inf = w L Inf = 0. If the incentive constraint for state θ M was binding, then the payment would be too low to induce the informed agent to work hard given the low state, θ L . The optimal contract with indirect communication between the agents is w Inf = ( c (q 1 2 ! q 0 2 ) , 0, 0) and w UnInf = ( 2c p 1 ( p 1 ! p 0 ) + q 1 (q 1 ! q 0 )
, 0, 0), and expected cost With no communication to the principal, signaling from the informed agent to the uninformed agent affects the incentives and the payments of both agents. The informed agent's payment is less than an informed agent who does not signal his information to the uninformed agent. This is due to the effect of the uninformed agent's actions on the informed agent's actions.
With the uninformed agent "following" the informed agent, the incentives the principal must provide are not as strong if the uninformed agent did not observe and follow the informed agent's action After seeing the informed agent's action, the now only partially uninformed agent only works hard in the two productive states, rather than in all three states when the agent was completely uninformed and this results in a payment that is less than the payment to a fully uninformed agent. The following proposition states the results concerning signaling and whether or not it is less costly for agents to be uninformed.
Proposition 3: If one agent is informed and information is shared via signaling, the principal will always prefer that the information be signaled to the uninformed agent rather than no information sharing, but the principal will prefer that both agents are uninformed if q 1 z
where y = p 1 -p 0 and z = q 1 -q 0 .
Just like in the previous section where the informed agent's information was disclosed to the uninformed agent, there are circumstances under which the principal prefers that both agents are uninformed. With lower productivity in the low state compared to productivity in the intermediate state, the informed agent's payment is too high, even with signaling and even with the lower cost of the uninformed agent. Note that the condition above in Proposition 3, similar to the condition in Proposition 2, is also stronger than the condition in Proposition 1. This means that the benefits of information sharing, even indirectly, may be more difficult to overcome with uniformed agents.
Next, I compare the two types of information sharing already analyzed: direct, which means the informed agent communicates to the principal, who discloses the information to the uninformed agent, and indirect, which means the informed agent does not communicate his information to the principal but partially signals his information to the uninformed agent via his productive action. With both direct and indirect information sharing, the principal always prefers information sharing to keeping the uninformed agent uninformed. Also with both indirect signaling and with the public release of information, the uninformed agent does not work hard when the state is θ H , which means that in terms of productive efficiency, both types of information sharing improve the uninformed agent's productive choices.
Comparing the two types of information sharing involves only an analysis of payments to both the informed agent and the uninformed agent. With both indirect and direct information sharing, the informed agent is paid in all three states. With indirect information sharing, because the informed agent signals his information, and because of the effect of the uninformed agent's actions on his incentives, the payment is lower than with direct communication. So the benefit to signaling as a means of information sharing is due to the reduced cost of the informed agent.
However, with the uninformed agent, whether there is a savings or not with signaling is unclear.
With signaling, the uninformed agent is not fully informed, as he is with direct information sharing. However, lack of information does not necessarily result in a higher payment, as the previous results showed that sometimes the principal preferred to keep both agents uninformed.
Whether or not the uninformed agent's payment is less costly with signaling than with direct disclosure by the principal depends on how the productivity states vary. With signaling, the uninformed agent's payment is a weighted average of productivity in the two productive states, while with direct disclosure, the payment is based on the actual marginal productivity of the state.
A state-by-state analysis reveals the tradeoffs involved. In the high productivity state, with signaling the principal is unaware of the state and must pay the uninformed agent, while with direct disclosure, the uninformed agent is not paid a bonus because the principal is able to distinguish the states. In the intermediate state, the uninformed agent's expected pay is more with signaling than with direct disclosure. Because the principal knows that the state is θ M , he can pay the agent a reduced payment, while without knowing the state, with signaling the pay is based inversely on the average productivity, which is less than the actual marginal productivity. In the state θ L , the situation reverses; with signaling, the expected payment is less than if the principal directly disclosed the information. Whether or not the uninformed agent's overall expected pay with signaling is less than with direct disclosure thus depends on whether the savings in the state θ L is big enough to overcome the cost in the other two states.
The following proposition formally states the result concerning the optimal mode of information sharing with the uninformed agent.
Proposition 4: With one informed agent, the principal prefers signaling between the agents rather than communicating and disclosing the information to the uninformed agent if q 1 z
From the standpoint of the principal, neither method of information sharing dominates.
The least costly method of information sharing when one agent is informed depends on the productivity in the low state being low enough compared to productivity in the intermediate state.
This is similar to the previous results for conditions under which the principal prefers agents are uninformed. Signaling reduces the cost of the informed agent, and may reduce the cost of the uninformed agent. While disseminating information formally through the accounting system has benefits, including some not considered here, it is important to understand the benefits of other means of communicating information.
Conclusion
This paper studies incentives related to communication and information sharing in teams, where agents work in correlated environments, whose output is jointly determined, and who also are not identically informed about productivity. Whereas communication is not valuable on its own, it is valuable when that information is disclosed to the uninformed agent via a verifiable report from the principal. The paper also considers a less formal mode of information sharing, one where the informed agent signals his information to the uninformed agent through his action.
The downside to signaling is that the principal remains uniformed and cannot tailor the uninformed agent's payments to the actual state, but the advantage is that the informed agent's payment is lower due to the effect of the uninformed agent's actions. The principal may prefer indirect signaling to the public release, depending on how the states of productivity vary.
The model in this paper uses risk neutral agents in order to focus on incentives, while prior work on communication with single risk averse agents found benefits of communication in terms of better risk sharing. However, an improvement in risk sharing may be hampered in a team setting. With the joint team performance measure, individuals bear more risk than without teams.
While this paper finds benefits in terms of incentives with communication of asymmetrically informed teams, an extension of this paper could study this tradeoff in terms of risk more closely.
Several other extensions could include expanding the information system, or the tasks of the agents. In this paper, the information system provided a perfect pre-decision signal of productivity, and the performance measure was a perfect measure of the team's output, and agent's worked in a perfectly correlated environment. Considering error or bias in the signal, the performance measure and even an imperfectly correlated environment may have an impact on whether communication and information sharing are valuable. Finally, another extension could involve the endogenous acquisition of information, as in previous work (Demski Sappington, 1987; Lambert, 1986) . With asymmetric agents, acquiring information may very well depend on whether or not it is communicated to the principal and whether information is shared with the other uninformed agents. p 1 y + q 1 z < (1 + p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) 3q 1 z + (1 + p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) p 1 y + q 1 z , which can be rearranged as q 1 y p 1 x <1/2. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
With one agent informed and direct disclosure, the principal will prefer that both agents are uninformed if 2(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c p 1 y + q 1 z < (1 + p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) 3q 1 z + p 1 z + q 1 y 3yz , which can be rearranged as (5q 1 z ! p 1 y)(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) 3q 1 z( p 1 y + q 1 z) < p 1 y + q 1 x 3yz + 2(1 + p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) + (1 + p 1 p 0 + q 1 q 0 )
(2( p 1 y + q 1 z) + ( p 0 y + q 0 z) . This inequality will hold if q 1 z[5(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) -q 1 (p 1 z + q 1 y)] < p 1 y[(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )y + q 1 (p 1 z + q 1 y)], which can be rearranged as: q 1 z p 1 y < (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) y + q 1 ( p 1 z + q 1 y) 5(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) y ! q 1 ( p 1 z + q 1 y) . 
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof consists of two parts.
1. With one agent informed, the principal will prefer signaling to no signaling if (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3(q 1 + q 0 )z + 2(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3( p 1 y + q 1 z) < (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3q 1 z + (1 + p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c p 1 y + q 1 z . For the informed agent signaling is less costly, because by inspection (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3(q 1 + q 0 )z < (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3q 1 z . Signaling is less costly for the uninformed agent if 2(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3( p 1 y + q 1 z) < (1 + p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c p 1 y + q 1 z , which is true.
2. The principal will prefer that both agents are uninformed to one informed with signaling if 2(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c p 1 y + q 1 z < (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3(q 1 + q 0 )z + 2(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3( p 1 y + q 1 z) which can be rearranged as 4 p 1 y + q 1 z < 1 3(q 1 + q 0 )z , or q 1 z p 1 y < q 1 (3q 1 + 4q 0 ) . 
Proof of Proposition 4:
The principal will prefer signaling to direct disclosure if expected payments are lower, or if (1 + p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) 3q 1 z + p 1 y + q 1 x 3yz > (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3(q 1 + q 0 )z + 2(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c 3( p 1 y + q 1 z) or q 0 y(1 + p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) + q 1 (q 1 + q 0 )( p 1 z + q 1 y) q 1 (q 1 + q 0 )yz > 2(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )c ( p 1 y + q 1 z) . This inequality will hold if p 1 x[(p 1 y + q 1 x)q 1 (q 1 + q 0 ) + (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )q 0 x] > q 1 y[2x(q 1 + q 0 )(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) -(p 1 y + q 1 x)q 1 (q 1 + q 0 )], or:
q 1 z p 1 y < q 1 (q 1 + q 0 )( p 1 z + q 1 y) + q 0 x(1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 ) (1+ p 1 2 + q 1 2 )(2q 1 + q 0 ) y !( p 1 z + q 1 y)q 1 (q 1 + q 0 ) . 
